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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

MOSE ALIX, et al.,

Case

Defendants and Respondents,
vs.

9,167

Appellant's
Reply Brief.

LEON BROWN,
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

ARGUMENT
Respondent in this cause made, and makes no effort
in his brief to answer the appellant's points squarely and
under the same headings as set out, but, instead, in an
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attempt to dispose of them by making his own arguments
under unrelated points that fail to meet the issues raised,
and by beclouding those issues with ttplatitudinous" halftruths and semi-quotations from cases, insinuates facts and
law, that, thus contrived, appear plausible, and which
closer analysis will show are not sustainable.

POINT I.
REFUTATION of RESPONDENT'S POINT I( REGARDING RESPO,NDENT'S CLAIM OF TAX
TITLE AS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT LOWER
COURT'S JUDGMENT)
Respondent would have it appear that acquisition of
a county tax deed and payment of taxes over a period,
would, without question, clothe him with a title so valid
and formidable as to exclude all thought of any question
thereto or thereof.
Much is made of the fact that appellant ttoffered no
testimony or other evidence at any time" (Respondent's
Brief, Page 9). Yet, at the same time, it will appear that
respondent did not introduce in evidence, or have marked
any exhibits, offer any abstract of title in evidence, or in
anywise, except for the self-serving affidavit of intervening plaintiff, Brown, the respondent herein, relating
to his purported use of the property; and, consequently
respondent's evidentiary pretentions rise to no higher dignity than any exhibits or affidavits filed and offered by
appellant. All were before the trial court, and considered
during the hearing.
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Respondent's counsel further overlooks the point
that, as well stated in Price vs. Hanson, 206 Pacific 272,
60 Utah, 29, by this Honorable Court, that:
((We remark, however, that a party seeking
to intervene in a particular action should make it
appear that he would have been at least a proper
party to the action when it was commenced, and,
in which he seeks to intervene, and that he would
have been entitled to the relief he seeks in a separate
action in the same court against the parties against
whom he seeks relief."
Certainly, at the time of the commencement of this
action in 1947, the respondent might have qualified as a
proper party, but ((would he have been" THEN, entitled
to the relief which he seeks here. The obvious answer is an
((ABSOLUTE NEGATIVE", since in 1947, when appellant's action was instituted, respondent, whatever the
worth of his purported tax deed, could not have then
had a title by adverse possession based on seven years
occupation, usage, payment of taxes, particularly since,
in view of the subsequent holding of Toronto vs. Sheffield,
222 Pac. 2nd 594, 118 Utah 460, the legislatures then
abortive attempt at a short statute of limitations had
been declared unconstitutional, and particularly, inasmuch as respondent claimed no interest prior to September 16th, 1942.
Further, (Respondent's Brief, page 11), there is an
attempt to alleviate the effect of the cited portion of L.
H. Gray's affidavit (Appellant's Brief, page 3) relative
to the claimed invalidity of Salt Lake County's then
impending tax sale. No matter how much or how many
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other reasons, especially those that might seem pertinent
to a layman, may be set forth in the protest as to the tax
sale, obviously those inapplicable may be regarded merely
as surplusage, and, do not contradict or detract from the
statement contained therein that the real property herein involved, nis not assessed according to law".
Respondent (Respondent's Brief, page 15) arrogates
to himself as beneficial the statements in the Porschatis
and Ford affidavits (Rec. 32-34; Appellant's Brief, pages
9-10) filed by appellant, whereas in truth and effect they
illustrate, at most, intermittent and less than the full, complete, adverse, occupation and usage of the property, with
notice to all the world thereof, that is required under the
circumstances.
There are extensive quotes (Respondent's Brief, pages
13-15) from the case of Peterson vs. Johnson, 84 Utah 89,
34 Pac. 2nd 697, to prove that there is a parallel situation
in that and the instant case. No such conclusion may be
drawn, nor is it justifiable, for in the Peterson case, it was
apparent that the plaintiff's tax title was sufficient as
against defendant's claim of boundary establishment by
fence, in absence of (a) Any showing that defendant's
deed to his own land included the tract in dispute, (b)
That there was any boundary line agreement made pursuant to a dispute in connection with the establishment of
the fence, (c) That there had been any long period of
acquiesence in the line established by the fence.
Whereas, in this case, as shown by the deed to appellant herein (Rec. 3 5), his claim was not as to land to
which he had no claim or color of title; and the realty
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here in question was described and included within his
deed description. The situation in the Peterson case is nowise comparable with the instant case on the facts or the
law, and the omission from the respondent's quoted excerpt of the fact (page 698, 34 Pac. 2nd), ((It is further
made to appear that the strip of land in dispute is within
the description contained in the plaintiff's deed, and the
defendant has all of the land covered by the description in
his deed, INDEPENDENT OF THE STRIP OF LAND
IN CONTROVERSY" destroys the contextual meaning
of the original quote.
POINT II.
REFUTATION O,F RESPO'NDENT'S POINT II:
(Relating to respondent's claim that appellant made no
showing of title.)
Respondent's arguments under this heading are so
self-contradictory and illogical as to destroy any effectiveness therein.
For example, respondent (Respondent's Brief, page
17, asserts appellant did NO'T plead title to the land in

himself, and yet at that same point (Respondent's Brief,
page 17) quotes from the lis pendens, and cites that appellant had filed his complaint praying for rr quieting of
title in appellant." Certainly, any complaint to quiet title
in due form would contain the essential allegations of
ownership, possession, or entitlement thereto.
Again, respondent assails appellant's ((Quit-Claim
Deed" as though some sort of stigma was attached to the
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taking of a quitclaim deed, and although grudgingly conceding a quitclaim is effective to convey the interest of
the grantor, attempts to cast aspersions on the taking of
that type of deed. Certainly, a warranty deed (in the
absence of after acquired title, which is not involved here)
could convey no greater title than could a quitclaim
deed used.
Respondent's futile attempts at parallelism are further illustrated by his attempt to misconstrue the meaning of the language and wording quoted from Pender vs.
Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 Pac 2nd 1057, into some kind of
meaning, albeit grossly distorted, presumably favoring his
cause. The language in that case is inapplicable to the
case at bar, because there has been no showing, and no such
item was here involved, as a deed absolute given as a
mortgage, which, when the debt was paid and the obligation cancelled, operated to extinguish the force and effect of the deed, so that a conveyance by the deed holder
would be ineffectual to carry any title to the grantee.
Here, the deed of Arnold Wall (Rec. 3 5) is as much
prima facie valid to convey title as was respondent's tax
deed.
The quotation by respondent from Campbell vs.
Union Savings & Investment Company, 63 Utah 366, 226
Pac. 190, fails to include the pertinent information stated
by the Court, that such rule as cited, was based on the fact
that (page 192), t(No claim is made in the answer and
counterclaim (to the there plaintiff's quiet title action)
that Langlois, who executed and delivered the mortgage
(assigned to defendant) had or claimed any right or title
in the property in question, nor that the plaintiff claimed
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under or through said Langlois. Indeed, in defendant's
answer and counterclaim, Langlois is not connected with
the title to the property in question." Lifted out of context, and without reference to the facts, the respondent's
quote appears definitely not in point, nor suggestive of a
rule of property law consonant with any facts in this case.
POINT III.
REFUTATION OF RESPONDENT'S POINT III
-(Anent the Statute of Limitations).
Assumption that the pretended occupation of the
premises by respondent herein [which as shown by affidavits filed on behalf of appellant herein (Rec. 32-34) to
have been at most intermittent and disjoined, and nonexclusive] was so exclusive as to deprive appellant of the
benefit of having any possession or occupation, should
be viewed in the light of the language of the Court in
Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company vs. Olson, 70
Utah 95, 258 Pac. 216, in the following excerpt:
Page 222 Pacific cc [ 6] The presumption is against the
question of title by adverse possession.", and again at
Page 227 Pacific: ccln adverse possession the
possession must be actual, for otherwise there is no
disseisen, and the real owner remains in possession
actually and constructively. It must be continuous, for, upon suspension or interruption, possession
in contemplation of law is again in the holder of
the legal title; and it must be hostile to the real
owner, and with the intention to claim the land
adversely to him. This claim must be manifest
from the nature of the circumstances of the pos-
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session, so that the owner may be informed of it,
and that he shall not be misled into quiescence in
what he might reasonably suppose to be a mere
trespass when he would not aquiesce in the assertion of a right adverse to his own title."
Respondent's excerpt from Wood vs. Dill, 3 Kan
App 484, 43 Pac 822, is not applicable to the circumstances here, as the court there very properly held that a
mechanic's lien foreclosure that omitted as a party, a
mortgagee appearing of record, did not toll the statute
of limitations respecting the time to foreclose the lien
against the mortgage holder, since ((Their owner's and
mortgagee's interests were neither common nor identical."
Certainly, here, the purported interests of Salt Lake
County passed on to the respondent Brown in the tax deed,
were common and identical, encompassing the same, if
any, rights to the land in question.
The quoted portion from the Marek vs. Smith case,
314 Pac 2nd 864, relating to applicability of the statute
of limitations to a new party, is an inapplicable rule as to
this situation both factually and otherwise. The case
shows that the county pleading the statute, had disclaimed
any interest in the premises, and claimed that its interest
having been conveyed long since, it was not and could not
become a party to the action against the bar of the statute
of limitations. Further, there was no showing in such
cause that the county pleading the statute of limitations
was either an absolutely ((necessary" party, or an ((indispensable" party.
In the .carlisle vs. Monongahela Railway Co. case, 16
F. R.D. 426, the portion cited is based on the federal pro-
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cedure that a plaintiff that cannot join for jurisdictional
reasons certain other parties, cannot in effect circumvent
the rule by having an interpleader of a second party, who,
may in turn seek to join another party, identically the
same as which plaintiff could not join in the first instance.
The dicta quoted from the Kam Koon Won vs. E. E.
Black, Ltd. case, 75 Fed Sup. 55 3, is shown up by the
actual holding in the case, to the effect that t(U nder these
circumstances the claims of intervening plaintiffs related
back (page 564) to the date when the action was filed
by the original plaintiff for himself and in their behalf."
All of these situations, quoted piecemeal, seem to sustain plaintiff in intervention and respondent's position
until analyzed and the factual situation shown up so as
to differentiate them from the situation in the instant case.
Indeed, the situation here is akin to that commented
on by our Court in the Case of Upper Marion Ditch Company, 94 Utah, 134, 76 Pac 2nd 234, where the court said
at:
Page 240 Pac. 2nd t( [ 16-18] : Whenever a party
has been omitted, whose presence is so indispensable to a decision of the case upon its merits that
a final decree cannot be made materially affecting
his interests, the Court should not proceed to a decision of the case upon the merits. The objection
may be made by any party at a hearing or on appeal or error, and the court will upon its own motion take notice of the omission and require the
omitted party to be made a party-to the litigation,
even though no objection is made by any party
litigant."
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And, as stated by the Court in Reader vs. District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 94 Pac 2nd 8 55,
98 Utah 1, at page 861 Pac. 2nd:
tt/9 /The failure of the court to obtain jurisdiction over one of the indispensable parties rendered the judgment as to all of them void."
So here, to permit the case to proceed, the respondent
would have had to have been joined in the original Mose
Alix suit, to continue proceedings, or in absence thereof,
judgment could not be rendered, and to permit the joinder,
either as a defendant, or in that effect by intervening, there
is a necessity for tolling the statute of limitations until the
necessary party is joined.
In this connection, see Bank of California National
Association vs. Superior Court, 106 Pac. 2nd 879, 16 Cal
516, at page 8 8 3, as to a further discussion of what may
constitute indispensable parties, and how to classify parties to an action.
CONCLUSION
The situation in this case is akin to that set out by
the Court in Turner vs. White, 12 So. 601, 97 Alabama
545, where the Court said at page 603:
((3. It is a principle often repeated, that, if, during the pendency of a suit, any new matter or
claim not before asserted is set up and related back
by complaint, the defendant has the right to insist
upon the benefit of the statute until the time that
the new claim is presented, because until that trial,
there was no lis pendens as to that matter between
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the parties .... But this was no amendment by the
plaintiff and Mrs. Turner came into the· suit on
her own petition, filed in accordance with the
statute, to make herself a defendant as landlord,
and against the objection of the plaintiff, she was
admitted to defend her title against the claim of
title by the plaintiffs, and the very purpose of her
application and of her being admitted was to test
the strength and validity of competing titles. Her
claim was within the lis pendens. If the statute
of limitations gave her a title against plaintiffs'
assertion on which she was willing to rely, why
should she come into this suit? When admitted in
the manner in which she was, her position in the

case was the same as if notice had been served on
her to make her a party, at the same time it was
served on the other defendants."
It follows that the application of intervenor herein
to enter this case, places him in the same position, as an
indispensable party joined as a party de.fendant, and the
statute of limitations is tolled as to him, and the pendency of the action brought by plaintiff, tolls the
statute of limitations until such time as the indispensable
party (respondent here) is so joined, either volun tarily,
or involuntarily. It having been so demonstrated that
respondent has interposed no real, substantial, or legal
aspects contrary to the position advocated by appellant
in his original brief, then it is the prayer of the appellant,
that this Honorable Court, find that the statute of limitations tolled as to the respondent, that there are justiciable issues of fact involved in this cause, and, questions
as to the sufficiency of the adverse possession purportedly
relied upon by defendant, and reverse the action of the
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district court in entering a summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent in this
cause, and remand the same for further proceedings to
the district court.
Respectfully submitted,

R. S. JOHNSON,
Attor:ney for Plaintiff and
Ap~pellant

Receipt of three copies and due service hereof, acknowledged this ________________ day of April, 1960.

Attorneys-/or-Intervening Plaintiff and
Respondent, Leon Brown.
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